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This paper investigates how different damage rules in patent infringement cases 
shape competition when intellectual property rights are probabilistic.  Most of the 
literature on patent protection assumes ironclad patents and no uncertainty regarding 
patent claims.1   The analysis of damage rules in the literature also seems to implicitly 
assume no uncertainty.  This is puzzling in that there would be no infringement to speak 
of with ironclad patents under the damage rules adopted in the US and analyzed below.   
Therefore, I develop a simple model of oligopolistic competition that incorporates the 
probabilistic nature of patents.   I also point out the logical inconsistency in the concept 
of the “reasonable royalty rates” when intellectual property rights are not ironclad.  
Patent infringement damages are intended to protect intellectual property rights 
and compensate for the pecuniary loss that the patentholder has suffered from the 
infringement.  In the US, there are two main liability doctrines that have been used to 
assess infringement damages.  The “unjust enrichment” rule aims at deterring theft of 
intellectual property right by punishing the infringer who is required to disgorge all the 
profits from the infringement.  This doctrine was mainly used in the assessment of 
damages up until the 1946 Amendment of Patent Act.  Since then US courts have shifted 
towards the “lost profit” doctrine that is compensatory in nature.  It intends to make the 
patentee “whole” by enforcing the defendant to make up for the difference between the 
patentee’s pecuniary condition that would have been without infringement and the one 
after the infringement.2  Often the courts seem to conclude that all these approaches yield 
more or less the same estimate or similar effects, if implemented correctly.   The aim of 
                                                 
1 Recently, however, more attention has been paid to the probabilistic nature of patent protection and its 
implications for competition.   See Lemley and Shapiro (2005) for recent analyses of probabilistic patent 
protection.   
2 Currently in the US, economic damages in patent infringement litigation are based on Title 35, Section 
284 of U.S. Code, which mandates that damages be adequate to compensate for the infringement, but no 
less than a reasonable royalty rate for the use of the subject patented invention.  
this paper is to analyze how these different damage rules affect competition in different 
ways and to understand what factors derive the differences.  
Considering the recent explosion in patent litigation and increasingly important 
role of intellectual property rights as a competitive strategy, it is important to understand 
the impact of different damage rules on market competition.3  Even thought there is a 
long standing interest and extensive discussions on patent damage rules in the law 
literature, formal and rigorous economics analyses on this issue are virtually non-existent 
with the exceptions of Shankerman and Scotchmer (2001) and Anton and Yao 
(forthcoming).   
More specifically, I consider a duopolistic competition with a patent holder of 
product innovation and a potential infringer.  Until recently, the existing literature on 
innovation typically assumed ironclad patents that are assumed to be valid with certainty 
and a well-defined scope of protection.  In reality, however, most patents issued face a 
significant amount of uncertainty in terms of their commercial value, validity, and scope 
of protection.  I thus develop a model that explicitly accounts for the uncertain nature of 
patents.4  In fact, in my basic model which assumes product innovation and equal 
production cost, there will be no infringement under the damage rules analyzed below if 
ironclad patents are assumed.  Both the paten holder and potential infringer are aware of 
the probabilistic nature of patents and compete in the shadow of litigation in that the 
amount of damages to be paid in the case of infringement depend on the strategies taken 
in the market place.  The set-up of the model reflects the fact that a significant number of 
infringements can go undetected for more than a nominal period of time and the 
resolution of disputes entails significant delays in the court system.5
                                                 
3 See Bessen and Meurer (2005). 
4 See Lemley and Shapiro (2005) for an excellent discussion of probabilistic patents.  They discuss 
implications of patent litigation uncertainty and potential reforms of the current patent system in the US.  
However, they do not analyze and compare the effects of different damage rules on market competition. 
5 See Crampes and Langinier (2002) for a model in which the patentholder invests in monitoring to 
supervise the market and detect infringement. 
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The main model of Shankerman and Scotchmer (2001) considers a vertical 
relationship in which a patent on research tools is licensed to a potential infringer who 
can develop a commercial product.  However, they analyze ironclad patents and show 
that the lost profit/reasonable royalty rate damage rule suffers from a multiplicity of 
equilibrium due to the circularity of logic inherent in the concept.  In contrast, I consider 
a probabilistic patent and the non-existence of a “reasonable” royalty rate that is 
consistent with the logic.6   
This paper is very closely related to Anton and Yao (forthcoming) who 
independently developed an equilibrium oligopoly model of patent infringement in which 
they analyze the impact of patent infringement damages on market competition.  They 
consider a process innovation and provide an in-depth analysis of the lost profit measure 
of damages.  In contrast, I analyze a product innovation and the focus of my paper is on 
the comparison of different damage rules.7  The difference in the nature of innovation – 
product or process innovation – across these two papers turns out to be important.  The 
process innovation implicitly assumes the availability of substitute technologies.  In 
particular, it allows a “passive” form of infringement under the lost profit rule, in which 
the imitator infringes and produces at a lower cost, but at the output level that would have 
been produced without infringement.  This type of infringement can lead to no lost profits 
for the patentholder and complicates their analysis.  However, such infringement strategy 
is ruled out under product innovation.  In sum, my paper and Anton and Yao (2005) focus 
on different types of innovation and different aspects of damage rules.   These two papers 
                                                 
6 Shankerman and Scotchmer (2001) also consider a model in which the patentholder is able to develop the 
commercial product herself and infringement can lead to a race between the patentholder and a potential 
infringer.  However, competition takes place in the R&D stage and there is no competition in the product 
market.                                                                            
7 Even though Anton and Yao (forthcoming) also analyze alternative damage rules, they are of secondary 
importance.   
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thus can be viewed as complementary in that taken together they provide a more 
complete picture of the impact of damage rules on competition.  
In a different vein, Ayres and Klemperer (1999) argue in favor of denying 
immediate injunctive relief and substituting delayed probabilistic determination with 
monetary damages.  They show that delay and uncertainty restrict patentees’ market 
power and induce limited infringement without substantially undermining patentees’ 
incentives to innovate.  In addition, any shortfall in the patentees’ profits due to limited 
infringement can be compensated by lengthening the length of the patent.  Their 
argument is based on the logic of the envelope theorem and the “Ramsey intuition.”8  In 
this paper, I do not address the relative merits of delayed damage rules with uncertainty 
vis-à-vis injunctive relief.  Instead, I take the uncertainty associated with the current 
damage system and substantial delay until the resolution of dispute as given, and compare 
the effects of different damage rules on interim competition.    
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way.  In section II, I set 
up the basic model of competition with probabilistic patents under various rules of 
damages.  I also extend and check the robustness of the basic model by considering the 
possibility of asymmetric cost structure between the patentholder and the infringer.   
Section III analyzes the reasonable royalty rate rule and points out the logical 
inconsistency of the doctrine with uncertain patents.  Section IV allows ex ante licensing 
and analyzes how different damage rules affect the terms of ex ante licensing contracting.  
Concluding remarks follow in section V. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Ramsey pricing suggests that the optimal tax structure that minimizes the deadweight loss for generating 
a given amount of revenue tends to tax as many goods as possible to create small distortions in broad 
markets.   Allowing a monopoly power through the patent system is similar to imposing a tax.  If each year 
is viewed as separate product markets, this suggests that the patent length should be infinite with the scope 
of patent appropriately adjusted to generate the same discounted value of monopoly profit.   
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II. The Model 
  I consider a situation called “two-supplier world,” in which a patentholder (firm 
1) and a potential competitor/infringer (firm 2) are the two suppliers of the patented 
product.  These two firms compete in the Cournot fashion with both firms simultaneously 
choosing quantities as a strategic variable.   Let  112 (, ) qq π and  212 (, ) qq π  be the profit 
level for the patentholder and the infringer, respectively, when they produce   and     1 q 2 q
before any ruling on damages.  As standard in the literature, we assume that the strategic 












Without any intellectual property right involved, each firm i maximizes  12 (, ) i qq π  











, for i  =1,  2     (1), 
which implicitly defines each firm’s reaction function  =  i q () ij R q , where i =1, 2 and i≠j. 
In the absence of IPR, the Nash equilibrium outputs ( , ) are at the intersection of 
these two reaction functions.  We assume that the Nash equilibrium is well-defined, 
unique, and interior with  > 0 and  > 0. 
1* q 2* q
1* q 2* q
  Now I introduce intellectual property rights in the model.  Firm 1 has a patent for 
a product innovation.  Firm 2 can produce the good either with license or by infringing 
the patent.  We first analyze how market competition plays out assuming that firm 2 
decides to infringe the patent.  After the competition the court decides if firm 2 has 
infringed the patent.  We assume that the IPR is uncertain in the sense that the 
infringement is found with probability α, which is assumed to be common knowledge 
between the patent holder and potential infringer.9  There are many reasons for this 
uncertainty.  For instance, the patent may be declared invalid by the courts.  According to 
U.S. patent law, the issuance of a patent does no more than confer a patent right that is 
“presumed” valid (35 U.S.C.A. Sec. 282).  The final responsibility for validating or 
invalidating the patent resides with the courts.  In addition, the "doctrine of equivalents" 
                                                 
9 See Lemley and Shapiro (2005). 
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entitles the patented invention to cover a certain range of equivalents.  However, the 
exact boundary of the equivalents is impossible to draw.  The matter of infringement can 
be reasonably assumed to be decided case by case.  Finally, for process innovations, 
infringement may not be detected.  In such a case, the probability of detection is also 
reflected in the parameter α.  Once the infringement is found, the court requires the 
infringer to compensate the patent holder for his transgression.   I consider two damage 
rules, the unjust enrichment and the lost profit, and investigate how they affect market 
competition. 
II. 1. Competition with Uncertain Patents under the Unjust Enrichment Rule 
In this subsection, I analyze how the patent-holder (firm 1) and the potential 
infringer (firm 2) compete in the product market under the “unjust enrichment” (UE) 
damage rule.   According to the UE rule, the patentholder is entitled to recover profits 
earned by the infringer.  Since the probability that the patent is deemed to be valid and 
the infringement is found is α, the patentholder solves the following problem: 
 
1
11 1 2 2 1 () (, ) (, )
UE
q 2 Max q q q q απ α π Π= +         (2) 
The first order condition for firm 1’s optimal output   is given by  1 q
  
11 1 2 2 1 2
11 1









= ,       ( 3 )  
which implicitly defines firm 1’s reaction function    =  1 q 12 (;)
UE Rq α .  
The potential infringer solves the following problem. 
 
2
22 (1 ) ( , )
UE
q 1 2 Max q q απ Π=−           (4) 
 
Notice that the potential infringer’s profit under the UE rule is a scaled down version of 
the profit in the absence of any intellectual property rights.  Thus, given  , the optimal 
choice for firm 2 is the same as in the normal Cournot competition.   More precisely, the 
first order condition for firm 2’s optimal output   is given by 
1 q
2 q










,         ( 5 )  
 
which implicitly defines firm 2’s reaction function    =  2 q 21 2 1 () ()
UE R qR q = .  The Nash 
equilibrium royalty rates [
*
1 ()
UE q α , 
*
2 ()
UE q α ] are at the intersection of these two reaction 


















Proof.  See the Appendix. 
 
Lemma 1 reveals an interesting strategic effect under the UE rule.  As the strength of the 
patent (parametrized by α) increases and it becomes more likely that the patent will be 
upheld in the court, the infringer competes more aggressively whereas the patentholder 
plays the role of an accommodator.  The intuition is that the patent holder receives firm 
2’s profit when the patent is held valid.  As a result, firm 1 behaves as if it had partial 
ownership (α share) of firm 2.  Firm 1 internalizes the effects of its output on firm 2’s 
profit and behaves less aggressively compared to the standard Cournot competition.  This 
effect is represented by an inward shift of firm 1’s reaction function with  12 (;)
UE Rq α < 
.   In response, firm 2 behaves more aggressively with strategic complements.  12 () Rq
 
II. 2. Competition with Uncertain Patents under the Lost Profit Damage Rule 
I now analyze how the patent-holder (firm 1) and the potential infringer (firm 2) 
compete under the alternative rule of “lost profit” (LP).  Under this rule, the patentholder 
is entitled to recover lost profits due to infringement.10  Let  
M π  be the monopoly profit 
                                                 
10 In actual patent infringement cases, lost profits are considered an appropriate measure of patent 
infringement damages if the following four conditions can be established: 1. demands for the subject of 
intellectual property exist, 2. acceptable noninfringing alternatives do not exist, 3. the plaintiff have the 
capacity to manufacture and market the infringing products, and 4. economic damages can be quantified 
with reasonable probability.  These four conditions are called the Panduit test.  The set-up in my model 
satisfies all these conditions. 
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that the patent holder would have received in the absence of any entry. Then, the 
patentholder solves the following problem under the LP rule: 
 
1
11 1 2 1 1 () (, ) [ (, ) ]
LP M
q 2 Ma x qq qq απ α π π Π= +−  =  112 (1 ) ( , )
M qq α π −+ α π   (6) 
The first order condition for firm 1’s optimal output   is given by  1 q










,       ( 7 )  
which implicitly defines firm A’s reaction function    =  1 q 12 1 2 () ()
LP R qR q = .   
The potential infringer solves the following problem. 
 
2
22 1 2 1 1 2 (, ) [ (, ) ]
LP M
q Ma x qq qq πα π π Π= − −         (8) 
The first order condition for firm 2’s optimal output   is given by  2 q
   
212 112
22









= ,        ( 9 )  
which implicitly defines firm 2’s reaction function    =  2 q 21 (;)
LP Rq α .   Thus, the strategic 
incentives facing the imitator in the LP regime is isomorphic to those facing a firm that 
has partial ownership of α in the rival firm.  As a result, the market outcome in the LP 
regime is a mirror image of the one in the UE regime with the roles of the firms reversed. 
The Nash equilibrium royalty rates [
*
1 ()
LP q α , 
*
2 ()
LP q α ] are at the intersection of these 

















Proof.  It can be proved by proceeding in a similar way as in the proof of lemma 1. 
 
Corollary.  Let ( , ) be the unique Nash equilibrium of the game in the absence of 
IPR.  Then, we have 
1* q 2* q
*
1 ()
UE q α  <   < 1* q
*
1 ()
LP q α and 
*
2 ()
LP q α <   < 2* q
*
2 ()
UE q α  for all α ∈ 
(0, 1].  
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Proof.  The absence of IPR corresponds to the case of α = 0, that is,   = = 













11 2 (( ) ,( )
UE UE qq ) π αα <  <  11 2 (* ,* ) qq π
**
11 2 (( ) ,( )
LP LP qq ) π αα and 
**
21 2 (( ) ,( )
LP LP qq ) π αα <  <  21 2 (* ,* ) qq π
**
21 2 (( ) ,( )
UE UE qq ) π αα  for all α ∈ (0, 1].  
Proof. We know that 
*
1 ()
UE q α  <   < 1* q
*
1 ()
LP q α and 
*
2 ()
LP q α <   < 2* q
*
2 ()
UE q α .  This implies 
that 
**
11 2 (( ) ,( ) )
UE UE qq π αα
*
11 2 (( ) , *
UE qq πα 11 2 (* ,* ) qq π < < , where the first inequality 




UE q α >   and the second inequality follows from the 
definition of the Nash equilibrium.  Similarly,  < 
2* q
11 2 (* ,* ) qq π
*
11 2 (* , ( ) )
LP qq π α < 
**
11 2 (( ) ,( )
LP LP qq ) π αα .  Once again the first inequality is due to the fact that 
*
2 ()
LP q α <   
and the second inequality follows from the observation that firm 1’s reaction function 





LP q α = 
**
12 1 2 (( ) ) (( )
LP LP LP Rq R q ) α α = = 
1
*
112 argmax ( , ( ))
LP
q
qq π α .  Taken together, 
I have proved the first part of Lemma 3.   
  The second part can be proved in an analogous manner. We 
have
**
21 2 (( ) ,( )
LP LP qq ) π αα < 
*
21 2 (* , () )
LP qq π α <  with the first inequality 
coming from 
21 2 (* ,* ) qq π
*
1 ()
LP q α >  and the second inequality resulting from the definition of the 
Nash equilibrium.   By the same token,  <  < 
1* q
21 2 (* ,* ) qq π
*
21 2 (( ) , *
UE qq πα )
)
**
21 2 (( ) ,( )
UE UE qq π αα .  The second inequality is from the fact that firm 2’s reaction 
function under the unjust enrichment doctrine is the same as the reaction function in the 
absence of IPR, that is, 
*
2 ()
UE q α = 
**
21 2 1 (( ) ) (( )








Proposition 1. With the symmetric production cost structure across firms, we have 
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better than the unjust enrichment rule whereas the potential infringer prefers the unjust 
enrichment rule to the lost profit rule. 
Proof.  With equal production efficiency between the patent holder and the potential 
infringer, we have  
11 () ()
LP UE α α Π− Π= {
**
11 2 (( ) ,( )
LP LP qq ) π αα + 
**
11 2 [( ( ) , (
ML P L P qq ) ) ] α ππ α α − }  
                                  − {
**
11 2 (( ) ,( ) )
UE UE qq π αα
*
21 2 (( ) , * ( ) )
UE qq +απαα }  
            =   
** **
11 2 21 2 { [ ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))]}
M U EU E U EU E qq qq απ π α α π α α −+
                                  + 
** **
11 2 11 2 (1 )[ ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( ))]
LP LP UE UE qq qq α παα παα −− > 0 
The inequality above follows since 
M π ≥  112 212 (, ) (, ) qq qq π π + for any combination of 
and   12 (, ) qq
** **
11 2 11 2 ( () , () ) ( () , () )
LP LP UE UE qq qq π αα παα >  by lemma 3.   
  Similarly, we have 
2 ()
UE α Π − 2 ()
LP α Π =[
**
21 2 (1 ) ( ( ), ( ))
UE UE qq α πα − α
)
]        
                               − {
**
21 2 (( ) ,( )
LP LP qq π αα − 
**
11 2 [( ( ) , (
ML P L P qq ) ) ] α ππ α α − } 
                  > (1−α) − { −  21 2 (* ,* ) qq π 21 2 (* ,* ) qq π
**
11 2 [( ( ) , (
ML P L P qq ) ) ] α ππ α α − } 
                            = α[ ]   
**
11 2 [( ( ) , ( ) )
ML P L P qq ππ α α −+ 21 2 (* ,* ) qq π
                            > α[ ]>0.  11 2 [ ( *, *)
M qq ππ −+ 21 2 (* ,* ) qq π
The first two inequalities follow from lemma 3 and the last inequality follows from the 
fact that 
M π >  11 2 21 2 (* ,* ) (* , * ) qq qq π π + . 
 
Corollary.  The LP rule provides more R&D incentives than the UE rule.    
  I have not specified how the innovation takes place.  I can consider two 
alternative scenarios.  In the non-tournament case in which only one firm can invest in 
R&D, the innovation incentives depend on the patentee’s expected profit.  In the 
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tournament case in which the two firms engage in an R&D race to be the first firm to 
innovate, the R&D incentives typically depend on the difference between the patentee’s 
and potential entrant’s profits.11  In both scenarios, the incentives to innovate are higher 
under the LP rule. 
II. 4. Unique Efficiencies 
 
  The result that the lost profit damage rule provides better protection for the patent 
holder in subsection II.3 hinges crucially on the assumption that the two firms are equally 
efficient and produce a homogenous product.  If the potential imitator is much superior in 
its production cost or produces a sufficiently differentiated product thereby expanding the 
market demand, the patent holder may prefer the lost profit damage rule.   
To see this possibility with sufficiently differentiated products, consider an 
extreme case in which the product produced by the imitator creates a new market and its 
introduction does not affect the profit of the patent holder.  In this case, there will be no 
lost profit for the patent holder and the imitator is not liable for any damage.  In contrast, 
under the unjust enrichment damage rule, the patent holder would be able to recover the 
profit of the imitator with probability α.  
The same is true if the imitator is much superior in production efficiency vis-à-vis 
the patent holder.  More specifically, consider a situation in which both firms produce a 
homogeneous product with a linear market demand of p = A –Q, where  Q =   +  .  
Their respective constant marginal costs are given by   and   for firm 1 and firm 2.  If 
they compete in the Cournot fashion, it can be easily verified that the following holds: 
1 q 2 q
1 c 2 c
*
1 ()










LP q α = 
21 (1 ) 2 (1 )
3







UE q α = 
12 (1 ) 2 (1 )
3















The patent holder’s equilibrium profits under each regime are given by: 
 
                                                 
11 See Reinganum (1988) for a survey of R&D models. 
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1


















UE Π  =  
2
















Let d =   −   ≥ 0 denote the efficiency advantage of the imitator and normalize 
= 0, which implies that  = d.  It can be easily verified that 
1 c 2 c
2 c 1 c 11 () ()
LP UE α α Π− Π< 0 if d ≥ 
A/2.  In addition, we know that  11 () ()
LP UE α α Π− Π> 0 if d = 0 by Proposition 1.  A 
straightforward calculation shows that 







, which implies that there 
is a unique d*∈(0, A/2) such that  11 () ()
LP UE α α Π− Π≥  0 if and only if d ≤ d*. 
This result is consistent with Shankerman and Scotchmer (2000) who show that 
the unjust-enrichment doctrine does a better job of protecting the patent-holder in a 
vertical relationship between the patent-holder and the potential imitator in which only 
the latter has the capability to develop a commercially marketable product.12  The case 
considered in the Shankerman and Scotchmer is formally equivalent to the case of d ≥ A 
(>d*) in my setup. 
 
III. Welfare Analysis 
In the previous section, I investigated how the patent holder and the potential 
imitator behave in the output market under the damage rules of “lost profit” and “unjust 
enrichment” and compared their profits under the respective regimes.  In this section, I 
analyze welfare implications of the two regimes. 
I define social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Let 
**
12 () ()
LP LP LP Qq q α α =+and 
**
12 () ()
UE UE UE Qq q α α =+be the aggregate market output 
under the LP and UE regimes, respectively.  Then 
                                                 
12 Shankerman and Scotchmer’s (2000) result holds if infringement would not be deterred under the unjust 
enrichment rule in their model.  They need this additional condition since they consider a certain patent 
with α=1, and thus the potential infringer is indifferent between infringement and non-infringement in their 
setup.  With a probabilistic patent, the potential imitator always has incentives to infringe under the unjust 
enrichment rule. 
    12 
i SW  =   + [
0 [ ( ) ()]
i Q ii P x dx P Q Q − ∫ 1
i Π +  2
i Π ] = 
**
11 22 0 () () ()
i Q ii Pxd x c q cq α α −− ∫ , 
where i = LP or UE. 
 
III. 1. Equal Efficiencies between the Patentholder and the Potential Imitator 
  Suppose that the two firms have the same production cost of  =  = c.  Notice 
that with the symmetric cost structure, 
1 c 2 c
11 2 2 ( ; ) () () ( ; )
LP UE RR R R α α ⋅ = ⋅= ⋅= ⋅  and 
12 ( ; ) ( ; )
UE LP RR α α ⋅=⋅, that is, the reaction function of the patentholder under LP is 
identical to that of the potential imitator under UE and the reaction function of the 




LP q α = 
*
2 ()
UE q α  and 
*
2 ()
LP q α = 
*
1 ()
UE q α .  In other words, only the roles of the 
firms are reversed across the two regimes.  As a result, the total outputs in both regimes 
are identical, i.e., 
**
12 () ()
LP LP LP Qq q α α =+= . 
**
12 () ()
UE UE UE qq αα += Q
 
Proposition 2.  Ex post innovation, the two damage rules yield the same social surplus. 
 
So far, I have not focused on development incentives and have taken the 
innovation as given.  Since the two damage rules provide the same social surplus with 
equal efficiencies between the patent holder and potential imitator, I can conclude that LP 
is superior to UE if the development incentives are taken into account.   
 
III.2. Unique Efficiencies 
  I now investigate welfare implications in the event of cost asymmetry between the 
patentholder and the potential imitator.  With cost asymmetry, there are two 
complications.  First, the total output need not be identical across the two regimes.  In 
addition, even if the aggregate outputs are the same, the distribution of the market shares 
affect the total production costs.   
  It is difficult to have any analytical results on the comparison of the total outputs 
and welfare across the regimes in the general set-up.  By making assumptions about the 
specific form of the market demand curve, one can make quantitative assessments of the 
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aggregate outputs across the regimes.  I thus consider a linear demand curve to address 
the welfare question.  Assume p = A –Q, where Q =   +   as in subsection II.4.  Then,    1 q 2 q
**
12 () ()
LP LP LP Qq q α α =+=
12 (2 ) (1 )
3







UE UE UE Qq q α α =+= 
12 (2 ) (1 )
3






The following result immediately follows. 
 
Lemma 4.  
**
12 () ()
LP LP LP Qq q α α =+> 
**
12 () ()
UE UE UE Qq q α α =+if and only if  >  .  1 c 2 c
 
As a result, with a linear demand curve, the market price under the LP regime is lower 
than that under the UE regime if the patenholder has a higher production cost than the 
potential imitator.  However, this does not imply that the welfare under the LP regime is 
higher than that under the UE regime when  >  .  The reason is that the patentholder 
produces a disproportionately larger share than the potential imitator under the LP 
regime, which is relatively inefficient when the patent holder has a higher production 
cost.  Indeed, as the next Proposition demonstrates, with a linear demand curve the 
inefficiency in production outweighs allocative efficiency of the LP regime vis-à-vis the 
UE regime when  >  . 
1 c 2 c
1 c 2 c
 
Proposition 3.  With a linear demand, social welfare is higher in the LP (UE) regime if 
< (>) .   1 c 2 c
Proof.  With a linear demand of p = A –Q, we have 
LP SW  = 
**
11 22 0 () () ()




[(4 ) (1 ) ][(2 ) (1 ) ]
2(3 )
Ac c Ac c α αα α
α






















−− + + ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
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UE SW  = 
**
11 22 0 () () ()




[(4 ) (1 ) ][(2 ) (1 ) ]
2(3 )
Ac c Ac c 2 α αα α
α

























Therefore, we have 














, which proves the claim.  
 
  The result in Proposition 3 also has implications for welfare analysis of the effects 
of partial ownership of competitors’ assets in an industry.13  It suggests that if firms are 
asymmetric in their efficiencies and sizes, it would be better for social welfare for a small 
and inefficient firm to have partial ownership of a large and efficient firm rather than the 
other way around, as usually is the case.  The reason is that the small firm will restrict its 
output after acquiring partial ownership and the large firm will expand its output in 
response with industry output being shifted toward the firm with lower marginal costs.14
 
IV. How Reasonable is the “Reasonable” Royalty Rate? 
  When the lost profits or actual damages from the infringement cannot be proved 
or deemed to be too speculative, the court accepts a “reasonable” royalty rate as an 
alternative measure of damage.15  Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp. 
established 15 factors that can be considered in determining the reasonable royalty rate.      
Not surprisingly, in actual patent cases licensing experts on the plaintiff side tend to 
identify the factors that lead to high royalty rates while the infringer side points towards 
                                                 
13 For an analysis of the competitive effects of partial equity interests in an oligopolistic industry, see 
Reynolds and Snapp (1986), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Kwoka (1992), and Reitman (1994). 
14 Farrell and Shapiro (1990) make a similar observation.  The most literature on partial ownership assumes 
symmetric firms and emphasizes the potential for collusion that such ownership entails.  In contrast, Farrell 
and Shapiro show that welfare may well rise as ownership becomes more concentrated with a small firm 
buys part of a bigger firm, due to more efficient output distributions between heterogeneous firms. 
15 More precisely, the law specifies that any award cannot be lower than the reasonable royalty rate.    
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the factors that lead to low royalty rate.  As a result, this doctrine has proved difficult to 
implement in a consistent and predictable manner (Conley, 1987).  However, the essence 
of the rule is considered as a “hypothetical license” approach that defines the reasonable 
royalty rate as “[t]he amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as 
the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time of the infringement began) if both had 
been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement.”  
  In considering the counterfactual scenario to calculate what the infringer should 
and would have paid with a hypothetical negotiation between the infringer and patent 
holder, it should be recognized that the negotiation between them takes place in the 
shadow of litigation and the damage rule in case of infringement.   More precisely, let   
be the “reasonable” royalty rate that is expected to be paid by the infringer without 
licensing.  This expected royalty rate sets the expected payoffs of each party in the 
absence of licensing, which serves as the threat point in the bargaining.  The potential 




22 1 2 2 () (, )
RR e
q Max q q r q απ α Π= −  212 2 ,) ] Pqq cq = [( 2 − 2
e rq α −   
            =   212 2 2 [(,)( ) ]
e Pqq c r q α −+ 
 
Thus, firm 2 behaves as if its marginal cost were .  Let  2 ()
e cr α +  12 *( , ) i cc π  be the 
standard Cournot equilibrium profit for firm i when firm 1’s and 2’s costs are given by 
and  , respectively.  Then, firm 2’s expected payoff from infringement under the 
reasonable royalty rate regime is given by  .  This payoff serves as a 
reference point in the bargaining between the patentholder and the potential infringer.  
For simplicity and concreteness, let me assume that the negotiation takes place in the 
form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer by the patent holder.
1 c 2 c
21 2 *( , )
e cc r π +  α
                                                
16 Then, the royalty rate in a 
hypothetical negotiation will be set to maximize: 
 
16 Allowing a more balanced bargaining power between the patent holder and the potential infringer as in 
the generalized Nash bargaining solution does not change any qualitative results.   
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α Π∂ +
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∂
) > 0.  This implies that the constraint 
will be binding.  Let the solution to the above problem be  .  Then, it is clear that  =  r  r 
e r α  .  The “reasonable” royalty rate requires that  =  , which implies that  = 
e r  r  r  r α .  
This condition can be satisfied only when α =1, that is, patent protection is perfect and 
there is no uncertainty about the validity of the patent.  In fact, when α =1, we have a 
continuum of “reasonable” royalty rates that are consistent with the logic.  However, if 
the patent is probabilistic with α ∈(0, 1), the concept of a “reasonable” royalty rate that 
presumes a hypothetical negotiation is flawed since there is no “reasonable” royalty rate 
that is consistent with the logic.   
 
Proposition 4. When the patent is probabilistic, there is no “reasonable” royalty rate that 
is consistent with the logic.  When the patent is ironclad (α =1), the concept suffers from 
an opposite problem, that is, a multiplicity of reasonable royalty rate.  
Shankerman and Scotchmer (2001) also recognize the circularity and self-
referential nature of equilibrium in the logic of this doctrine.17  In their model, they 
consider ironclad patents in which intellectual property rights are enforced with certainty.  
In such a framework, they show that licensee fees and prospective damages are equal and 
self-enforcing.  Due to this bootstrapping nature of equilibrium, there is a continuum of 
                                                 
17 To emphasize the circularity of the logic, they avoid using the term “reasonable royalty” and instead  
refer to “lost royalty.”  
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reasonable royalty rates that are consistent with the logic.  However, when there is 
uncertainty about the validity of patents, I point out that there is a more serious and 
opposite problem arises, that is, there is no reasonable royalty rate that is consistent with 
the logic.   
 
The inconsistency of the logic in the case of uncertain patents is not difficult to 
understand.  The hypothetical ex ante negotiation is supposed to take place under 
uncertainty about the validity of the patent (i.e. α ∈ (0,,1)),  whereas the damage liability 
consideration is relevant only in the ex post case that the patent is found to be valid 
(α =1).   As the value of a winning lottery ticket cannot be equal to the value of a lottery 
ticket before the drawing, the value of the patent that is certified to be valid in the court 
cannot be equal to the value of the patent with uncertain validity.  However, the 
equivalence between these two is exactly what the “reasonable” royalty rate doctrine 
implicitly requires.   
 
IV. Ex Ante Licensing Contract 
  In section II, I analyzed how the lost-profit and unjust-enrichment rules affect 
market competition between the patentholder and the infringer.  In this section, I allow ex 
ante licensing and analyze how different damage rules affect the terms of ex ante 
licensing contracting with frictionless bargaining.   In this case, the equilibrium profits 
under respective damage rules serve as the threat points in the bargaining game between 
the patentholder and the potential infringer as in the analysis of Shankerman and 
Scotchmer (2001). 
  As in the previous section, let me assume that the negotiation takes place in the 
form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer by the patent holder.18  The royalty rate in a 
hypothetical negotiation will be set to maximize: 
 
11 1 2 2 1 2 , () * (, ) (, )
L
rF Max c c r rq c c r F απ Π = ++ ++ 
subject to 
                                                 
18 Once again, allowing a more balanced bargaining power between the patent holder and the potential 
infringer as in the generalized Nash bargaining solution does not change any qualitative results.   
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21 2 2 *( , ) ( )
K cc r F π α +−≥ Π , K =UE, LP 
It is clear that the incentive constraint holds with equality with   =  F
21 2 *( , ) cc r π + −  2 ()
K α Π .  Thus, we can rewrite the problem as: 
1 1 12 2 12 212 2 () * (, ) * (, ) (, ) ()
L K
r M a x c cr c crr q c cr α ππ Π = ++ ++ +− Π α  
 
Lemma 5. Let r  be the lowest r such that  212 (, ) qcc r + = 0, that is, the minimum royalty 
rate that induces exit by firm 2.  Then, 
1 1 12 2 12 212 2 ( ) *( , ) *( , ) ( , ) ( )
L K cc r cc r r qcc r α ππ Π = ++ ++ +− Π α  is strictly increasing in r 
for r ∈[0, r ) 
 
Proof.  The first order condition with respect to r is given by: 
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By the first order condition for profit maximization, we know that  = c and 
= c + r.  Therefore, we can rewrite 
112 '(, ) Pq c c r +






11 1 2 2
22
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()
L dq c c r q
Pcr
dr c c
α ⎡⎤ Π∂ + ∂
=− − − + ⎢⎥ ∂∂ ⎣⎦
1 2 c c r +
, which is positive since 
> 0 for all r <  Pcr −− r  and the expression in the square bracket is negative.  This 
result implies that the patentholder offers a very high royalty rate to induce firm 2 to exit 
from the market in exchange for a reverse lump sum payment of  2 ()
K α Π to the potential 
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infringer.  This contract will sustain a monopoly outcome in the market.19  I thus assume 
that antitrust authorities do not allow reverse payments (negative F). 
  With the constraint that F ≥ 0, the patentholder will set F = 0 and choose the 
highest r such that  21 2 2 *( , ) ( )
K cc r π α +≥ Π .  Since  21 2 *( , ) cc r π +  is decreasing in r, we 
can find a unique r that satisfies  21 2 2 *( , ) ( )
K cc r π α += Π . 
Proposition 5. Let ( ,  ) and ( ,  ) denote the equilibrium ex ante licensing 
contract under alternative regimes of UE and LP.  If the reverse payment is not allowed 







K r  is uniquely defined by 
21 2 2 *( , ) ( )




V. Concluding Remarks 
  I have developed a simple model of product innovation in which I analyzed how 
different damage rules in patent infringement cases shape competition when intellectual 
property rights are probabilistic.  In particular, I compared two infringement damage 
rules used in the US – the unjust enrichment rule and the lost profit rule.  Ex post 
innovation, these two rules are equivalent in terms of outputs and social welfare if the 
patentholder and the potential infringer are equally efficient.  However, with asymmetric 
inefficiency and a linear demand, the LP rule generates higher social welfare than the UE 
rule if and only if the imitator is more efficient than the patentholder.   The analysis has 
implications for the effects of partial ownership in the industry since the competitive 
effects of damage rules are isomorphic to those of partial ownership.   It also points out 
the logical inconsistency in the concept of the “reasonable royalty rates” when 
intellectual property rights are not ironclad.  
                                                 
19 See Farrell and Shapiro (2005). 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
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To derive comparative statics result with respect to α, we can write the expressions above 
in the following matrix form. 
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